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NLRB Regional Office Decision Making: Independence, Partisanship, and Caseloads

Southern Illinois University

As part of an investigation of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) regional office decision making, I examine decisions to dismiss cases or withdraw unfair labor practice complaints by unions against their employers by creating a cross-sectional time series data set from 1964 to 1986. I hypothesize that changes in economic conditions, traditional regional sympathies, and union membership coupled with the demise of the pro-labor coalition in the NLRB under the Reagan administration significantly increased the uncertainty by which decisions are made to dismiss or withdraw cases. In particular, regional offices with high caseloads or those who reside in states traditionally hostile to unions have higher withdrawal and dismissal rates. Further, changes in the NLRB under the Reagan administration influenced decisions to dismiss cases made by regional offices in economically declining areas and decisions by unions to withdraw cases. This suggests that regional offices may be reacting to environmental conflict and exhibiting independence from each other and the partisan preferences of the NLRB.

The American Review of Public Administration, Vol. 24, No. 2, 133-148 (1994)
DOI: 10.1177/027507409402400201


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