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Impoundment at the State Level

Executive Power and Budget Impact

University of South Carolina

Kim U. Hoffman

University of Central Arkansas

Presidential impoundment authority has been given extensive attention in the budgeting literature. Little research, however, has examined impoundment powers at the state level. This research note is an exploratory study of impoundment powers at the state level, focusing primarily on gubernatorial rescission authority. We use a survey of executive budgeting officers to examine the structure, use, and effectiveness of impoundment powers in the states. We find that gubernatorial impoundment authority is generally used to maintain balanced budgets during times of revenue shortfall. We also find that impoundments do not serve as a particularly effective policy mechanism for most governors.

Key Words: budgeting • impoundment • state • rescission

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